

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HPSCI Report on CI and Security Concerns

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Policy Branch/PPS

DATE

18 February 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. C/PSS/PTS

2/24

2.

C/CI&SG

3.

C/IG

4.

C/CG ✓ attached

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Attached is a copy of the unclassified HPSCI Report recently released on CI and Security Concerns. Please review and provide written responses (~~in writing~~) to the findings and recommendations sections on pages 3 through 8. The DDA has requested that our response be prepared in bullet form. Please respond to PPS by Friday, 20 February.

FORM 1-79

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

★ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1985-494-834/40156

- HPSCI Report -

FINDINGS

1. Failures have occurred and this Agency has initiated programs to heighten management awareness. We cannot accept any contention that CIA management has been unmindful of security concerns during the hiring process.

2. This Agency is keenly aware of the threat and as a consequence those elements engaged in applicant processing are working closer together than ever before. The cooperation among the Office of Security, Office of Medical Service and Office of Personnel has never been better than it is today.

3. We cannot agree with either contention. Senior Agency management has long been aware of the havoc created by Counter Intelligence and security failures. As an Agency we have learned from mistakes and have taken steps to correct them. As a result of the Kampiles case we are more attuned to the importance of the honesty issue and stress it during investigation. From the Howard case we learned of the absolute necessity of developing a plan of monitoring and counseling for employees facing separation.

4. While there may be a tendency to over value the polygraph because of its utility and productivity we have not lost sight of the need for a carefully balanced product that takes into consideration all elements of the whole person.

5. As an Agency we recognize this could become a problem and as a result we have tightened our quality control procedures. No clearance is a clearance for life and cyclical reinvestigations have been introduced to counter any such perception.

6. While there is no formal mechanism within the government this Agency does share counterintelligence and security information with other agencies when we are aware of the other Agency's interest. Polygraph-derived lifestyle issues must meet a threshold level and passage must be formally approved by the A/DCI. Because of sources and methods concern this Agency does not support a central repository or the creation of a centralized blacklist.

7. We agree. All security education programs are geared to reenforce this concern with our entire population. It should be noted however, that the Office of Security does not make need-to-know determinations. Operational managers and in the contractor world, industrial security officers have been charged with this responsibility and, admittedly, sometimes with mixed results.

8. We cannot quarrel with this contention.

9. Basically we agree that this statement has merit. However, since the release of EO 12036 this Agency has taken a more enlightened approach to classification.

10. There can be no doubt that a superficial background investigation will fail to discover some if not all of the pertinent issues. The Office of Security quality controls its investigations to ensure that all issues of interest are properly scoped and that sufficient contacts are made to enable developing this information. It should be noted that DCID 1/14 standards call for a minimum of twelve investigative contacts. Agency investigations currently average sixteen contacts.

11. This statement is correct and as noted above this Agency cannot support such a venture because of our sources and methods concerns.

12. This statement is partially correct. When you examine the Pollard and Chin cases ideology was the prime factor and in the Howard case, revenge was the motivational force. It can be very dangerous to highlight one issue to the exclusion of all others.

13. CIA has such a program in effect but because of resource constraints it has been uneven in its application. Thanks to a recent A/DCI initiative the program has been rejuvenated and we are in the process of attacking this problem.

14. The Edward Howard case is a good example. The Agency is developing new programs to monitor and assist problem employees undergoing separation.

15. We do not feel it appropriate to comment.

16. We believe the CIA has strong communications and computer security practices however, they are not perfect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As noted above, the cooperation and coordination that exists among internal applicant processing components has never been closer. At the community level, Intelligence Agencies have worked successfully under common DCID 1/14 standards for some time. A coordinated broad look at various hiring practices would be bureaucratically painful but might produce something valuable.

2. We do not feel it appropriate to comment beyond noting that the NIO for Disclosures is reportedly currently conducting studies in this manner.

3. We are in complete agreement. The Office of Security has had a long liaison relationship with the FBI.

4. We agree. The Agency's Security Education Program addresses the need for vigor. In the recent past we have implemented a strong approach in the area of computer security violations.

5. We agree but note that this is a decision that operational managers must make.

6. We do not feel it appropriate to comment.

7. Financial status is a strong area of concern in all our investigations.

8. Under the revitalized RIP program, reinvestigations will be prioritized at a level equal to most initial investigations.

9. The Agency does have a program for sharing such information when alerted. Information gleaned from the background investigation is provided in toto. Polygraph-derived lifestyle information is passed provided such passage has the formal approval of the A/DCI.

10. The Agency has had such a program for years however exit interviews lose value during a situation of mass retirements and/or resignations. In the industrial world most contractor security officers have been delegated this responsibility.

11. We do not believe it appropriate to comment.

12. We defer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for comment.

13. We agree. The Agency believes it has excellent programs and is constantly striving to improve them.

14. We do not believe it appropriate to comment.